Posted on

Bills of costs must be signed by principals or employees: what does that mean?

Update: 6 January 2008: Pinna v Kuek [1999] VSC 204 is a decision about the correlative section under s. 107, Legal Practice Act, 1996, which said (2) A bill of costs – (a) must be signed by – (i) the legal practitioner…’. O’Bryan J held that a letter signed by the legal practitioner enclosing a 10 page unsigned itemised bill of costs satisfied the requirements of the provision. Now that is made clear by the Legal Profession Act, 2004, since amendments which came into operation in 2007. The provision is s. 3.4.34(2A). Furthermore, it is no longer necessary for a partner of a firm to sign a bill. Any lawyer, including employees of the law practice rendering the bill may do so: s. 3.4.34(2).

Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228 is a very interesting case about bills.

Original post: The law on what constitutes a signature is:

‘the fact an actual signature is not the result of the act of signing is not critical to the validity of the document. Even a form with a signature impressed upon it by a printing machine[6] or where the person signing places upon the document an engraved representation of that person’s signature by means of a rubber stamp[7] have been held to satisfy the statutory requirement of a signature. A telex signature has also been held to be sufficient to constitute a proper signature.8] The critical element appears to be that the signature must also contain the additional characteristic that the person making the mark approves of the contents of the document.’*

Hoeben J said much the same thing at [42] in Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228 in the context of a NSW statutory provision which says that a bill of costs must be signed by a partner of a firm, or by a barrister, or an employee of either. That case is also the subject of the next post. Continue reading “Bills of costs must be signed by principals or employees: what does that mean?”

Posted on

Unrepresented barristers’ entitlement to costs in cases involving them personally

In Winn v GHB [2007] VSC 360, a barrister was personally a party in some litigation. She was admitted in Victoria but at the relevant time was practising in Brisbane under a Queensland practising certificate. She taxed her solicitors’ fees, and acted for herself. She appealed successfully from the order of the Taxing Master. She successfully sought an order for costs, but the only costs she was entitled to were costs of travelling to and from Victoria from Queensland for the hearings because the exception to the rule that unrepresented litigants are not entitled to costs except for out of pocket expenses applies only to solicitors and does not extend to barristers. Continue reading “Unrepresented barristers’ entitlement to costs in cases involving them personally”

Posted on

Client wins professional negligence case against solicitors at VCAT

Such a result is a rare turn up for the books. It would be an interesting exercise to think when a client last won compensation after a hearing down there. What’s more, the American client didn’t bother with representation, didn’t come to Australia for the hearing, and still won based on a statutory declaration he presumably put in the post. The case is L. Scott Turner v DCL [2007] VCAT 1296. Essentially, Senior Member Howell found that the solicitors did nothing much that was useful, and seems to have ordered the refund of fees charged as damages according to the principle in Heywood v Wellers (a firm) [1976] QB 446. As Walmsley et. al put it in their excellent Professional Liability in Australia, ‘where the professional’s breach of contract in respect of that part of the work for which fees are to be paid renders the professional’s services valueless or useless, he or she is not entitled to payment.’ This small case is exactly the kind of case the Legal Practice List is set up to deal with efficiently (which is not to say that it is unable to deal with much more complicated matters). It is a matter of continual surprise to me how rarely its jurisdiction is successfully invoked. Continue reading “Client wins professional negligence case against solicitors at VCAT”

Posted on

Arbitrators slice $40 million off plaintiff lawyers’ breast implant proceedings fees

22 July Update: what may be the first ever legal blog, and without doubt one of the best, Overlawyered has  a link to the arbitrator’s ruling, and links to some old posts dealing with the interlocutory stages of the case. And here’s Law.com’s article.

Houston plaintiff lawyer John O’Quinn has been ordered to repay clients $40 million in legal fees after he was found to have charged his clients for bar association fees, overheads, and flowers as part of a ‘general expenses fee’ of 1.5% of the settlement. Ironically, his former clients ganged up on him. In a class action. They wanted all the fees he charged them back — estimated at $0.66 billion:

‘A Texas Supreme Court case from 1999 opened O’Quinn up to the possibility of having to pay back all the collected legal fees. That case, Burrow v. Arce, held that if a lawyer breaks his fiduciary duty to a client by putting his own interest above the client’s, he can lose part or all of his fee — even if the lawyer did a good job.’

I’ve noted that case before. Scary. Not that he got away without penalty, exactly:

‘The order says that O’Quinn, through three legal entities under which he has practiced law, must pay back [AU$12] million he improperly charged clients and a [AU$28.5] million penalty because he broke his contract with them.

Posted on

The latest on fiduciary relationships

In the Citigroup Case referred to in the next post, Justice Jacobsen summarised the law relating to fiduciary duties. I have reproduced the whole of the relevant passage, which includes a restatement of the law (at [297]ff) relating to solicitors’ fiduciary duties to give prospective clients full disclosure about the disadvantages of time costing if such a course is proposed.  In my experience, those principles lie gathering dust in real life, and it is a harsh decision maker who trots them out to shaft some poor solicitor who really gets up his nose.  In summary, the principle is:

‘298 A solicitor who wishes to enter into a time charging costs agreement with the client must make full disclosure to the client of all the implications of such an agreement: see Foreman at435-437 per Mahoney JA; Re Morris Fletcher v Cross’ Bill of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 243 per Fryberg J; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis [2007] SASC 90 at [28] – [31] per Doyle CJ.

299 This principle applies whether or not the costs agreement is made before the solicitor is instructed: see Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171 at 186-187 per Baker and Burton JJ; see also McNamara at [38] per Doyle CJ.’

But here’s the entire exegisis of the law of fiduciary relationships, as applied specifically, to the general case of adviser and client: Continue reading “The latest on fiduciary relationships”

Posted on

Unconscionability and legal fee estimates, again

The law of unconscionable conduct has been rolled out again as a vehicle to adjust lawyers’ fees in the same way as they might be in a civil costs dispute under the Legal Profession Act, 2004, but in a case to which that Act’s regime did not apply. It has happened once before to my knowledge (see my previous post). In P&R v. Goodwin [2007] VCAT 1199, solicitors sued for their fees, but succeeded in obtaining an order only for the difference between the amount they estimated total legal fees to be at the start of the retainer, and the amount they had already been paid by the client. I do not think VCAT has jurisdiction in relation to disputes between lawyers and clients, because the jurisdiction is predicated on the engaging in of trade or commerce (VCAT has reserved on a test case in that regard). That aside, it is a relatively attractive forum in which to sue for fees. This decision may suggest that it is better to sue in a court, however, unless there is an unusual squeaky cleanliness in following the costs disclosure regime. Continue reading “Unconscionability and legal fee estimates, again”

Posted on

Legal Services Commissioner publishes annual report

The Legal Services Commissioner’s website is growing some content. Her annual report for the part-financial year ending 2006 is published there. In summary:

  • For those who enjoy the suffering of others, commencing at p. 22 there is a list of all the adverse disciplinary findings made by VCAT’s Legal Practice List, and it names the practitioners involved;
  • The Commissioner’s office has 3 executives in addition to Victoria Marles: Janet Cohen (formerly the Deputy Legal Ombudsman), David Forbes, and Diana Gillespie; 9 legal staff 2 of whom are part time; (2 out of the 13 mentioned are blokes) and 19 administrative staff;
  • She received 1,218 complaints under the new Act (6 a day), of which 664 were only disciplinary (55%), 310 were only civil (25%), and 244 were both (20%) (all of the complaints figures below are only about the new Act complaints received, except where indicated);
  • Only 33 were against barristers (3%);
  • 238 involved a costs dispute (20%), a surprisingly low figure, especially given that 553 of the complaints were about costs or bills (45%);
  • Only 117 involved a pecuniary loss dispute (10%) which shows that two-thirds of the 322 complaints characterised as being about “Negligence — including bad case handling and advice” were dealt with as disciplinary complaints or costs disputes which is most surprising;
  • Only 719 were handled by the Commissioner (59%) — the rest were referred to the Law Institute and the Bar for investigation and recommendation as to ultimate decision to be made by the Commissioner;
  • 67% of those delegated to the Law Institute involved a disciplinary complaint;
  • 14% were about wills and estates, 14% about conveyancing, 18% about family law, and only 5% about crime;
  • 6% were about conflicts;
  • There were 3 complaints of sexual impropriety;
  • There were no ‘other genuine dispute’ within the definition civil disputes in s. 4.2.2(2) of the Legal Profession Act, 2004;
  • No prosecutions were brought;
  • Not a single finalised disciplinary complaint was successful (and only 1 out of the 100 old Act complaints succeeded — it resulted in a reprimand);
  • There were 3 FOI applications to the Commissioner; and
  • The going tariff for a breach of the obligation to deliver up documents within time pursuant to the Commissioner’s power of compulsion seems to be a $500 fine and costs of $1,000.

The Office had revenue of $3.4 million (almost all from the Legal Services Board) of which $1.3 million went on staff, including training (an annualised average of $73,300 per employee, some of whom are part-time, but it gets a little complicated because the Commissioner spent $205,000 on temps), $1.1 million went to the Law Institute for functions the Commissioner delegated to it (there is a list of all delegations on p. 20) and $150,000 to the Bar for the same thing.

Astonishingly, 89% of all disciplinary complaints finalised were summarily dismissed pursuant to s. 4.2.10 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004. Almost 1 in 6 was chucked within 30 days, and almost 9 in 10 within 60. To be fair, this may represent the dross which has been sifted out, since 60% of the complaints received during the reporting period were still open at the end of the financial year, and 60% of them had been open for 2 months or longer. I say ‘astonishingly’ because I perceive it to be a radical departure from the practice of the Commissioner’s predecessors. In general, though, it is a good thing if the Commissioner uses her office’s limited resources to deal doughtily with the complaints which suggest conduct conducive of condine condemnation, while giving the drossmongers and feewhiners the short shrift they often deserve.

I saw the other day a set of circumstances which was unfortunate, and which I hope is not too often replicated. The Commissioner characterised a complaint as a pecuniary loss dispute (one of the species of civil dispute) and a conduct complaint. The particulars of the complaint read, in substance — “See the attached Family Court affidavit”. Rather hastily after the receipt of the complaint, the Commissioner exercised her discretion to bypass the dispute resolution procedures with which she is tasked in relation to civil disputes by giving the client a ticket to go off and agitate her professional negligence claim in VCAT. She referred to s. 4.3.6 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004 which says she can do so if she considers the dispute unsuitable for her to attempt to settle. The matter was referred to VCAT’s Legal Practice List. Then, the Commissioner realised that because the exact subject matter of the complaint was before the Family Court she had no power to deal with the complaint, which she dismissed pursuant to the power in s. 4.2.10(1)(e) of the Legal Profession Act, 2004, which says ‘The Commissioner may dismiss a complaint if— (e) the complaint is not one that the Commissioner has power to deal with’. Yet she did not withdraw the ticket she had mistakenly given to the c lient to refer the purported complaint to VCAT insofar as it amounted to a civil dispute in the belief that she did have power to deal with the complaint.

The Commissioner settled 10% of civil disputes. She let 5% through to VCAT’s pecuniary loss dispute jurisdiction, which would explain why it’s been quiet down in the Legal Practice List. That means 85% never went anywhere for various reasons. She summarily dismissed 53%. She refused to extend time 18 times.

Of the complaints summarily dismissed, 41% were dismissed for being frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance. 9% were dismissed because the Commissioner formed the view the complaint required no further investigation. One-third were dismissed on the basis the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction.

Posted on

And another Court of Appeal sets aside another gross overcharging conviction

As reported in today’s Australian Financial Review, the NSW Court of Appeal has told the Administrative Decisions Tribunal’s Legal Services Division that it got it wrong when it found a Sydney solicitor guilty of gross overcharging. The case is  LN v Legal Services Commissioner  [2007] NSWCA 130  Though the solicitor signed the bill, he did not really read it, and the Legal Services Commissioner obviously didn’t think hard enough about the charge, since the solicitor got off on the basis that he did not have personal culpability for gross overcharging. It is not well understood that there is no concept of vicarious liability for professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. He might have been disciplined for failure to supervise, I suppose, but that was not what he was charged with. The relevant decisions below are here and here.

Posted on

Court of Appeal sets aside unduly harsh outcome in gross overcharging prosecution

PJQ v Law Institute of Victoria[2007] VSCA 122 is the part 1 of the last chapter in a story of good tactical plays characteristic of professional discipline specialist Sam Tatarka in the representation of a solicitor charged with gross overcharging, and applying trust monies to pay his fees without the appropriate paperwork. It sounds like a plea bargain was entered into whereby the solicitor pleaded guilty to the charges on the basis that what led to the overcharging was overzealous representation and disorganization rather than dishonesty and in return, the prosecutor — the Law Institute of Victoria — would not make submissions as to penalty. But that is speculation. When it came time for ‘sentencing’, the solicitor offered an undertaking to the Tribunal that any file in which he proposed to charge more than $20,000 would be independently costed by a costs consultant. The Tribunal enquired whether he would submit to such costing by the Law Institute’s costs assessing service. The solicitor said yes.

In Law Institute of Victoria Limited v PJQ [2005] VLPT 8, the Full Legal Profession Tribunal came down hard, accepting the expert opinion of a man without a law degree that appropriate legal costs for a proceeding of the kind in which the solicitor had represented his client were half what he had charged, and suspending the solicitor from practice for 12 months. To the surprise of the President of the Court of Appeal, the Tribunal made no mention of the alternative to suspension represented by the undertaking despite going through the ritualistic ‘no punishment happening here’ recitations (‘Our task does not involve punishment of the legal practitioner. Our task is to provide for the protection of the public, including deterrence of the legal practitioner and the profession generally from like conduct…’; ‘Conscious of the necessity to place the barrier high before depriving a member of the profession of their practising certificate we have given all the circumstances of this case the most careful and repeated consideration.’ etc.).

President Maxwell, with whom Justices Chernov and Nettle agreed, held that the Tribunal’s inexplicable failure to mention in its reasons the undertaking offer suggested that its sentencing discretion had miscarried.  His Honour actually acknowledged with refreshing forthrightness that penalisation is part of sentencing for professional discipline offences, but, by his words, sought to give real meaning to the concept that protection of the public is what professional discipline is all about, by quashing the Full Tribunal’s orders and, on resentencing, making no orders in recognition of the substantial costs already incurred by the solicitor and the partially endured suspension: Continue reading “Court of Appeal sets aside unduly harsh outcome in gross overcharging prosecution”

Posted on

Confirmed: your client can privately prosecute you for misconduct

Acting President Bowman handed down a decision on Friday in Cedric Naylor’s Case [2007] VCAT 958 approving the existing practice of VCAT, and before it the Legal Profession Tribunal, of entertaining professional misconduct allegations against lawyers by their clients as part of applications to set aside costs agreements. Entertaining them, that is, outside the disciplinary investigation and prosecution procedures in Part 5 of the old Legal Practice Act, 1996, and regardless of whether those who otherwise prosecute disciplinary charges would have brought a charge.  Under the old Act, a costs agreement could be set aside upon proof by the client of (i) dishonesty in the solicitor, or (ii) misconduct or unprofessional conduct in the retainer, or (iii) a want of fairness and reasonableness of the agreement. Judge Bowman  ruled that it was not necessary for the solicitor to be found guilty of misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct in the ordinary way, by a prosecution by a legal regulator under the disciplinary provisionso of the Act before the client could rely on the second ground, but he did say that if misconduct is made out in an old Act case, then no disciplinary consequences such as a suspension of a practising certificate can follow in that hearing.  But, armed with the result in the s. 103 application, there seems to be nothing to stop the client sending the reasons in to the regulator and requesting investigation of the conduct already determined to be misconduct by the body which would hear any charge flowing from the investigation. And so, of course, there seems to be nothing to stop the client from threatening to do so in little spats over fees.

Continue reading “Confirmed: your client can privately prosecute you for misconduct”

Posted on

Rotten one day, perfect the next: Queensland’s complaints system

Now, that’s a cheap headline, I know, but I couldn’t resist. Queensland Legal Services Commissioner John Birton’s recent speech extolling the virtues of his office does read a bit like that, but probably deservedly so. The statistics he quotes speak for themselves: he’s not falling prey to the tendency of some regulators to drown in going through the procedures of unmeritorious complaints and having no time for greater proactivity. On the contrary, he is chortling about instituting an average of 22 investigations of his own initiative every month. For those who can’t be bothered reading it, here are some interesting tidbits: Continue reading “Rotten one day, perfect the next: Queensland’s complaints system”

Posted on

Victorian Legal Services Commissioner: 2 new brochures

Victoria Marles’s office has produced two new brochures, available from Information Victoria:

‘Are you making a complaint about legal costs? The LSC is required to make reasonable efforts to resolve costs disputes between legal practitioners and their clients. The brochure includes information on the maximum amount of costs which may be considered ($25,000); time limits for making a complaint and the process for making complaints.

Mediation service explained outlines how mediation can be used to resolve civil complaints.

Brochures and further information are available from the LSC at Level 9, 330 Collins Street, Melbourne 3000, phone 1300 796 344 (local call) or (03) 9679 8001 or visit www.lsc.vic.gov.au.’

Posted on

Man pays lawyer’s costs in hopeless VCAT Legal Practice List case

The Legal Services Commissioner is considerably better than were the Law Institute’s Professional Standards or the Legal Ombudsman at declining to give the time of day to self-evidently unmeritorious complaints against solicitors. Mind you, she has better discretions allowing her to do so under the Legal Profession Act, 2004. I don’t know what path George Anderson’s Case [2007] VCAT 383 took to get to VCAT, but it sounds like it really should not have been allowed to travel so far along the dispute resolution process. Once in VCAT, it was given short shrift and dismissed with an order that Mr Anderson pay the sued solicitor’s costs. What caught my eye, though, was the recital in the reasons without adverse comment of an eminent counsel’s drafting of a notice of appeal to the High Court and its provision to Mr Anderson under cover of a refusal to sign it. That brings to mind my earlier post on unbundled legal services and recent American treatment of the issue in case law. The practice has recently been the subject of criticism after thorough review of the American authorities in Delso v. Trustees for Plan of Merck & Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16643 (D.N.J. March 5, 2007). Legal Profession Blog’s take is here, and Freivogel on Conflicts Blog abstracts the case like this: Continue reading “Man pays lawyer’s costs in hopeless VCAT Legal Practice List case”

Posted on

Labour law firm confirms $1 million bonus to partner on class action win

A leading Melbourne labour law firm has confirmed paying its best known partner a $1 million bonus for procuring a settlement of the Dow Corning breast implants class action. Nothing wrong with that, by the way; I mention it only for prurient interest and to provide some context to the work the firm does pushing back the frontiers of injustice. A former partner’s suit making sensational allegations against the partnership was settled soon after details of those allegations were released by The Australian. But the former partner has now unconditionally withdrawn the allegations, apologised, and discontinued the proceedings. The firm has, however, confirmed that its head honcho received the $1 million bonus for procuring a $32 million settlement from Dow Corning, the company bankrupted by class actions around the world — many of the statements of claim containing the same typos, according to Walter Olson — involving what is now thought to be very questionable science indeed. (Something Andrew Bolt has cottoned onto — but note the egregious error in his article which claims that fees in no-win no-fee litigation in Australia may be “up to a quarter of any payout”. That is quite wrong. A success fee may be no more than 125% of the fees usually charged by the firm. What Bolt is describing is a US-style contingency fee which is stringently forbidden in Victoria.)

Posted on

Megafirm under scrutiny in defence procurement probe

Update, 20 January 2009: Latest Age article here. The full-pay sick leave, which has risen to ‘up to $430,000’, has come to an end, as has the relationship between the lawyer and the Department of Defence. But no resolution on the issues of interest to this blog.

Update, 25 August 2008: The Age article here. The Department has paid the lawyer $360,000 in sick pay.

Update, 20 July 2008: Canberra Times article here. The Department of Defence has admitted breaching its own procedures when, through the agency of the solicitor, who’s still on sickleave, it awarded lucrative contracts to firms with which the lawyer had past associations.

Update: 31 May 2007: latest Age article here. She’s still on paid sick leave.

Update: 14 July 2007: latest Age article here.

Update: 10 April 2007: latest Age article here.

Original post: A Department of Defence lawyer — legal counsel to the Defence Materiel Organsiation which has an annual expenditure of $9 billion — is on extended sick leave after scrutiny focused on her contracts with a megafirm where she is believed to have worked in a past life. The firm had $3.5 million of the Department of Defence / DMO work in 2005 and 2006 “without competition” according to The Age, up from $20,000 in 2004, the year of her October appointment as DMO general counsel.

Her bit of the DMO awarded $860,000 worth of contracts to another firm in the US — Shaw Pittman — without tender despite an adverse auditor-general’s inquiry into the earlier tender process for advice on the Federal Government’s privatisation of IT services won by Shaw Pittman despite its price being almost half as much again as its closest competitor. According to The Age, that cost the taxpayer no less than $16 million. The whole affair is summarised here (from p. 36 onwards).

The woman’s role was “reallocated” in September last year so as no longer to include “management of legal, procurement and financial investigation services”.

Posted on

VCAT’s jurisdiction over post-proceedings Family Law fees

Senior Member Howell determined today in M v JC Lawyers [2007] VCAT 273 that VCAT had jurisdiction to entertain a costs dispute about solicitor-client fees of post-proceedings negotiations under the threat of mutual applications to reopen under the change of circumstances provisions the final orders of the Family Court made 9 years previously. Continue reading “VCAT’s jurisdiction over post-proceedings Family Law fees”

Posted on

Man sues lawyer for declaration in reverse suit for fees

A client sued his former solicitor in VCAT for a declaration that no fees were owing because of costs disclosure defaults by the solicitor. Member Butcher stayed the proceeding pending taxation by the Supreme Court’s Taxing Master on the basis that the sending of a cost disclosure statement at the same time as the work done — in this case a letter of advice — was a default under the Act with the result that the fees were not payable until taxed by the Supreme Court at the solicitor’s expense. He also found that in those circumstances, no costs agreement had come into existence; the offer was made after the performance of the solicitor’s obligations under it. Continue reading “Man sues lawyer for declaration in reverse suit for fees”

Posted on

Solicitor-executor’s work not legal work

Patterson v S [1998] VLPT 11 is a decision of the Legal Profession Tribunal dealing with a sole practitioner who was the executor of a priest’s will. It held that executors’ work carried out by an executor who happens to be a solicitor is not legal work, and so fees for the work were not within a clause in the will entitling professional executors to charge their “usual or reasonable charges”. Continue reading “Solicitor-executor’s work not legal work”

Posted on

Texas Supreme Court strikes down contingency fee agreement provision

In Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, Supreme Court of Texas, 3 November 2006, the Court severed a provision in a contingency fee agreement which entitled the lawyer to three-tenths of the “present value of the claim” forthwith upon termination by the client, whether for just cause or not. Instead, the lawyer recovered three-tenths of the actual recovery, and only once there had been a recovery. Continue reading “Texas Supreme Court strikes down contingency fee agreement provision”

Posted on

Unpaid fees deny prof neg plaintiffs inspection of discovered file

Hammerstone Pty Ltd v Lewis [1994] 2 Qd R 267 BC9303056 is a useful case for solicitors sued for negligence. I advised a client to rely on it the other day, and he did, successfully, in the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne. He acted for a woman who failed to pay his bill. He sued, and was met with a set-off defence alleging professional negligence. He discovered his file but objected to inspection on the basis of the solicitor’s lien. That entitles a solicitor to keep clients’ property (including that part of a solicitor’s file that the client owns as a matter of law) as security for payment of outstanding fees. The Magistrate ordered the woman to pay a large proportion of the unpaid bill into court as a condition of inspecting my client’s file. This post is a little note on the case, which won the Magistrate over. Continue reading “Unpaid fees deny prof neg plaintiffs inspection of discovered file”