July 14th, 2016 · No Comments
Barnet Jade has given us an admirably constructed decision of Assessor Olischlager, a no-doubt busy decision maker in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court in NSW. Dupree v Russo  NSWLC 8 was a barrister’s suit for fees against a solicitor. Call me a dag, but it is always a pleasure to find diligent, elegant decisions carefully considering bang-on authority from the busiest decision makers who generally receive little assistance in the researching and writing of decisions. The decision considers whether costs agreements came into existence by the continued giving of instructions, and between whom, what disclosure obligations the barrister had, and whether the limitation period for suing for the fees was re-set by an acknowledgement of debt by the solicitor.
The barrister offered to enter into a costs agreement jointly and severally with his instructing solicitor and their client. The offer said that the continuing provision of instructions would be taken as acceptance. The solicitor continued to give instructions on behalf of the client. The Court found that a costs agreement arose: the instructions were given by the solicitor personally and as agent for his client, as an act of acceptance on both their parts. As the Assessor said: [Read more →]
More articles on: Costs agreements · costs disclosure defaults · Legal Profession Act · Professional fees and disbursements · The suit for fees
July 7th, 2016 · No Comments
Here is a link to a presentation by Ross Macaw QC on proportionate liability. It is produced by benchTV, an enhancement to the long-excellent new case notification service, Benchmark, provided by AR Connoly & Co in Sydney. Mr Macaw considers Justice John Dixon’s beautifully written judgment in Fabfloor (Vic) Pty Ltd v BNY Trust Company of Australia Limited  VSC 99.
In that case, there was a fire in a warehouse and the plaintiffs’ goods and nearby land were damaged. They sued the occupier of the warehouse and others. The occupier said that if it was liable, then it was also the fire inspector’s, the builder’s, and others’ fault as well. The question was what a defendant needed to do in order to have alleged concurrent wrongdoers not sued as defendants by the plaintiffs joined. Was a mere pleading assertion sufficient, as in the case of a third party notice? Or was it necessary to produce some evidence sufficient to allow the Court to see a prima facie case against the alleged concurrent wrongdoers, and exercise a discretion to join? Even though those seeking to join are not usually forced to establish by evidence a prima facie case, is that just because it is often waived by the person resisting joinder?
The answer is: you need a pleading which is not hopeless; you generally don’t need to put on evidence; the power to join is in s. 24AL of the Wrongs Act 1958 and the Rules of the Supreme Court are not really to the point; the power is discretionary and evidence might be necessary if some point which goes to the discretion (e.g. prejudice by virtue of delay, or abuse of process) is enlivened, but that evidence would not generally be as to the merits of the claim sought to be brought). [Read more →]
More articles on: "professional negligence" · defences · Negligence · Proportionate Liability
July 5th, 2016 · No Comments
In Kalloghlian v Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd  NSWSC 902 (the Court’s summary is here), a man said he purchased a Rolex in Syria in 2005. He insured his things with Chubb against loss anywhere in the world. The policy was described as ‘Deluxe’. It specifically insured items which the insured owned as well as things he possessed. The insured said he lost the watch on Copacabana Beach in July 2014. The police declined to take a report. He had no receipt from its purchase. He could not remember from which jeweller he had purchased it. He had lost his passport for the period of the trip to Syria. Chubb declined the claim. The insured sued. The Magistrate dismissed the suit. The insured appealed. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial.
The decision is hardly ground breaking. But it is simple. And it is useful to be reminded about the following:
- An insured may prove a loss by giving oral evidence of the loss. A lack of documentary or other corroboration is not fatal. It is just something to be assessed in considering whether the plaintiff has satisfied the Court it is more likely than not that he suffered the loss.
- That is so even where it is a condition of cover under the policy that the plaintiff provide various proofs of ownership and of loss. That is because s. 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 excuses breaches by the insured of policy conditions where the breach cannot have caused the loss, except to the extent of any prejudice to the insurer.
- Even busy decision makers in over-worked jurisdictions have to identify controversies raised by the parties which are necessary to determine in order to find for one party or the other, and explain why they resolved those controversies the way they did. A failure to do so will result in the decision being set aside. Robert Sheldon QC’s blog keeps an eye on this area of law. See here and here and here. The Court’s summary of the obligation in New South Wales to give adequate reasons is set out in full below.
- Where the facts are ascertained sufficiently that there is only one correct decision, the appellate tribunal may substitute its decision. Where, as here, however, it was necessary to take into account how witnesses presented, the appellate tribunal will remit the case to be re-heard, where necessary (as here) by a new decision maker.
The obligation to give proper reasons, especially where there are contests of oral evidence, is an important one and should be jealously guarded.
[Read more →]
More articles on: Insurance · Judges · Legal writing
June 23rd, 2016 · No Comments
Advocates’ immunity was, until recently, more powerful than many lawyers were aware. Since the 1 July 2015 introduction of the Legal Profession Uniform Law and the High Court’s May 2016 decision in Attwells v Jackson Lallic Lawyers Pty Limited, however, it may be narrower than many realise. And perhaps not everyone is aware that the immunity these days is very likely peculiar to Australia; it is certainly not a feature of English, American, Canadian, Continental, Indian, South African or New Zealand law. [Read more →]
More articles on: Advocates' Immunity · Barristers' immunity · Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) · Costs Court · Discipline · Insurance · Legal Profession Uniform Law · Legal Services Commissioner · National Profession Uniform Law · negligence as disciplinary breach · Professional fees and disbursements · Taxations · The suit for fees · Wasted costs
June 21st, 2016 · No Comments
Many disputes about costs are still governed by the Legal Profession Act 2004. It specified as the time in which to seek taxation a period of 12 months. Where a bill is given, the 12 month period starts from the date of service of the bill. But since Collection Point Pty Ltd v Cornwalls Lawyers Pty Ltd  VSC 492, it is clear that clients have until 12 months after the service of the final bill in any particular matter to seek taxation of any previous bill. Of course what is the final bill in the same matter is a difficult question. What is clear is that one costs agreement may govern several matters.
Applications to extend time must be made to a Justice of the Supreme Court (as opposed to any decision maker in the Costs Court or any Associate Justice) under s. 3.4.38(6). The law is well-summarised by John Dixon J in Rohowskyj v S Tomyn & Co  VSC 511, and his Honour’s guidance about the nature of an extension of time application is useful and prone to be overlooked: [Read more →]
More articles on: Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) · Costs Court · Legal Profession Act · Professional fees and disbursements · Taxations
June 19th, 2016 · No Comments
Parliament is considering a bill to re-instate the disciplinary register, and to prohibit the Bureau de Spank from trumpeting its successes before the respondent practitioners’ appeal rights are exhausted: Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Amendment Bill 2016 (Vic.). Cl. 150E of the Bill proposes to prohibit the Legal Services Board from providing to the public information about disciplinary orders made by the VCAT’s Legal Practice List while appeals or appeal rights are live. The prohibition extends beyond publication on the proposed disciplinary register to disclosure of information to the public more generally.
There is a problem with the Bill though: it focuses its protection of the profession on prohibitions of publications by the Legal Services Board about final orders. The Board shares a website and premises with the office of the Legal Services Commissioner. The CEO of the Board is in fact the Legal Services Commissioner, Michael McGarvie, who is also the applicant in all disciplinary prosecutions of lawyers in Victoria. Yet the CEO, qua Commissioner, is content for his staff to write about cases he is prosecuting, before any orders have been made and while the tribunal is considering what orders to make. On the homepage of the Board + Commissioner’s website, no less.
If parliament is concerned to ensure that the reputation of practitioners is not to be ruined by accounts of current proceedings by one of the parties to them where the aspect of things might change dramatically upon appeal, or even by bad decisions in such proceedings which are to be appealed, it ought to consider adding the Commissioner to the class of person covered by the prohibition, and to make clear that neither the Board nor the Commissioner ought publish details of disciplinary prosecutions while they are before the disciplinary tribunal.
It is not uncommon for appellate courts — the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal — to reverse decisions unfavourable to lawyers in disciplinary prosecutions of lawyers in VCAT’s Legal Practice List, or to substitute decisions more favourable to lawyers than those of VCAT or the legal regulators. So the no publicity pending appeal proposition actually has some important work to do in the real world. Consider, to name a few, Legal Services Commissioner v McDonald  VSC 237, PLP v McGarvie  VSCA 253, Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner  VSCA 374, Burgess v Legal Services Commissioner  VSCA 142, Brereton v Legal Services Commissioner  VSC 378, Byrne v Marles  VSCA 78, Quinn v Law Institute of Victoria  VSCA 122, Byrne v Law Institute of Victoria  VSC 509. Consider also non-lawyers: Omant v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia  VSC 512, and Towie v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria  VSCA 157 where the Court found that VCAT’s standard orders in disciplinary hearings were contrary to the privilege against penalties. It will be observed that some of those decisions were made by very experienced members of VCAT’s Legal Practice List, and several by its Vice-President, a judge.
[Read more →]
More articles on: appeals · Discipline · Legal Profession Act · Legal Profession Uniform Law · Legal Services Commissioner · Legal writing · litigation ethics · National Profession Uniform Law · Professional regulation · prosecutors' duties · regulators' duties · VCAT
May 18th, 2016 · No Comments
It’s Law Week. And a key event is a grand Bottled Snail event — ‘Terminus’ — combining the forces of Dan Walker’s Habeas Chorus, a choir of members of the legal profession, and Robert Dora‘s Melbourne Lawyers’ Orchestra, aka The Lawchestra, full of law students, barristers, solicitors, and a judge. It features, not very prominently at all, yours truly on second flute.
There is even a trailer you can watch here. There are two performances: afternoon and evening, this Saturday, in St Paul’s Cathedral (consider bringing a small cushion). You buy tickets here, and the profits will go to Bottled Snail which makes a substantial donation each year to the Tristan Jepson Memorial Foundation, whose aim is to improve the mental health of lawyers. Great strides are being made by our profession, a little late perhaps, but there is much more to be done with regard to mental health, as my own practice regularly reminds me.
W.A. Mozart’s last piece, his Requiem is the support act. Headlining the gig, though, is the Melbourne premiere of local composer Dan Walker‘s Last Voices, a setting of the last poems of D.H. Lawrence, Robert Herrick (a 17th century poet who begat ‘Gather ye rosebuds while ye may’), Elinor Wylie (a famously beautiful American poet popular in the roaring 20s), the American transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Thomas Hardy of Victorian England. It is beautiful and treads the line exquisitely between being accessible and being dumbed down. It’s tuneful yet dissonant. Modern, yet respectful of tradition. I love it. It’s not available on Spotify. There is not even a recording of it. It’s real yet improbably transitory. Either you come to the concert, or you miss out.
There are a lot of shows, and not much time. So I would not be surprised, unless you are a close relative or colleague of a performer, if you thought to yourself in contemplation of your own not so distant death — Life is too short to listen to community orchestras. But we’re absolutely nailing this one, and I have no hesitation in inviting you to come along in order to hear a great concert, rather than out of any sense of duty. If we were to attempt Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra, it could be painful. But these two pieces are the gas.
More articles on: Uncategorized
April 9th, 2016 · No Comments
In Council of the Law Society of NSW v MAG  NSWCATOD 40, a Sydney solicitor was disciplined for writing a private letter of complaint to a Federal Court judge the day after a decision was handed down, adversely to his client in favour of the Tax Man. The next day he wrote to the trial judge a letter not copied to the other side which commenced:
‘As solicitor for the Applicant in this matter, I have serious concerns about your conduct and decision in this matter. These are:
1. The somewhat immature and inappropriate comments you made to me …’ [Read more →]
More articles on: common law · Discipline · Ethics · Judges · litigation ethics · Misconduct
April 7th, 2016 · No Comments
An Appeal Tribunal within the ACT Administrative Tribunal has put out a neat little decision which makes clear that where solicitors do work and bill it, where the client does not seek taxation within the time for doing so, and the solicitors sue for fees, the tribunal hearing the suit for fees still has, in the ACT at least, jurisdiction to consider defences based on the quality of the work. In particular, work which may be said to have been wasted by virtue of negligence on the part of the solicitor will not be allowed by the Court. The lawyers in Williams Love & Nicol Lawyers Pty Ltd v Wearne  ACAT 18 essentially argued that they were entitled to sue on their bills as a debt once the time for taxation had passed.
In this case, the lawyers had negligently drawn a response to allegations of misconduct by an employee without obtaining the foundational document in which the allegations were actually made. When they belatedly obtained that document, the response had to be re-drawn. The Tribunal drew a distinction between a defence of waste as a result of incompetence and an argument that the fees were not ‘fair and reasonable’ in a more general sense, and confirmed essentially that the client had foregone the opportunity to mount ‘fair and reasonable’ arguments by not seeking taxation of the solicitors’ fees. Nevertheless, the Tribunal disallowed the suit for fees to the extent of the fees associated with the original drawing of the response. [Read more →]
More articles on: Negligence · Professional fees and disbursements · The suit for fees · Wasted costs
April 2nd, 2016 · No Comments
I only learnt in the last few years that Melbourne is one of the world’s great Jewish cities, with a globally significant series of communities of orthodox adherents. One of those orthodox communities has delivered up an interesting case. In Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v AL  VCAT 439, VCAT’s Acting President recently found a well known Melbourne solicitor guilty of two counts of professional misconduct, constituted by breaches of each limb of r. 30.1.2 of the solicitors’ professional conduct rules.
The rule prohibited conduct calculated to, or likely to a material degree to be, prejudicial to the administration of justice, or to diminish public confidence in the administration of justice, or adversely to prejudice a practitioner’s ability to practise according to these rules.
The practitioner’s disciplinary offence was first to state privately to his client’s father his disappointment after an orthodox Jew sitting watching someone else’s case in court had gone out of his way from the well of the court to assist police in the middle of a bail hearing in a criminal prosecution of the practitioner’s client. His second offence was committed when the man, whom I will refer to as the complainant since he lodged the disciplinary complaint which led to the practitioner’s disciplinary prosecution, rang the practitioner and asked him about comments to similar effect which the man had heard the practitioner had made, taping the call. The practitioner expressed directly to the man similar sentiments, expressly invoking the Jewish principle of ‘mesirah’ by which Jews who cooperated with secular authorities against fellow Jews in times and places where Jews enjoyed imperfect protection were ostracized. Jewish authorities have repeatedly said that the principle has no operation in modern day Australia in relation to criminal matters.
The Age has reported, in an article prominently featuring the practitioner, that victims of Jewish abusers have been pressured not to cooperate with police. It reported the Legal Services Commissioner as saying that ‘there was a general principle that made it impermissible for a lawyer to tell a witness they could not inform police about a matter because of a religious or community rule.’ I do not mean to criticise the Commissioner in this regard, because The Age sought his comments prior to the Commissioner’s receipt of the complaint, and the Commissioner was presumably simply responding to a general question about lawyers’ obligations towards witnesses in their cases. But what VCAT’s decision demonstrates is that the practitioner’s comments occurred after the conduct in question which the practitioner believed to have involved false statements based on misinformation, and were directed to a person who was not a witness and who, as far as the practitioner was aware, was simply someone who stood up in the well of the court and interfered in his client’s case. Given that, as far as the practitioner is said to have known, the man who stood up in court had no further role to play in the case or in his client’s drama more generally, it is hard to see how the practitioner could be said to have intended to pressure the man as a victim of a Jewish abuser not to cooperate further with the police in the future in bringing the abusers to justice, as seems to have been the implication. [Read more →]
More articles on: "disgraceful and dishonourable" · Briginshaw · common law · Discipline · duty to court · Evidence · litigation ethics · Misconduct · Rule of law · Vic Solis' Conduct Rules