This is a note about a decision by a judge who is only a year older than me, Justice Nye Perram, a novel and somewhat unsettling circumstance: Collard v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No. 3)  FCA 1681. I looked him up because the judgment is so beautifully written, and found a welcome in Bar News (go to p. 97). The case is about lawyers’ rights to appear for clients to be examined by ASIC (and also, incidentally, by the National Crime Authority). It is also of interest to me because of its discussion of who bears the burden of proof when seeking review in administrative law of a bureaucratic act which statute stipulates may only be taken if it is reasonable (or necessary) to do so. Who bears the burden of establishing reason or unreasonableness? Continue reading “Review of decisions to exclude lawyers from ASIC and NCA examinations”
I wrote about Byrne v Marles  VSCA 78 here, and suggested reversal by legislation as a possible outcome. The government slipped the Professional Standards and Legal Profession Act Amendment Act, 2008 through pretty quietly. Two new sub-sections in the Legal Profession Act, 2004 add to the existing parent sections that nothing within them gives lawyers a right to be heard in relation to how a complaint is to be dealt with, or whether it should be summarily dismissed. The relevant sections including their additions are set out below, and apply to complaints received by the Commissioner after 11 December 2008. I suggest that regardless of whether the Commissioner has an obligation to invite lawyers to do so, they should often take up these issues at the outset to ensure that there is in fact a valid disciplinary complaint, that its boundaries are clear and not exceeded, and that the Commissioner does not otherwise act without power.
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mining Projects Group Limited  FCA 1620, Justice Ray Finkelstein, aka da Fink, sowed a seed for future courts to take up and declare that regulatory authorities bringing civil penalty proceedings should have the same duties as criminal prosecutors. Having cited the authority to say that they do not, his Honour said:
’35 A lay person might be forgiven for thinking that in the present context the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings is somewhat artificial and that in both kinds of proceedings the regulatory authority or prosecutor (as the case may be) is under a duty to ensure that the decider of facts (judge or jury) is best placed to arrive at the proper and just result.’
Then, with the judicial equivalent of biting sarcasm:
‘Perhaps the reason courts have rejected this approach is that in a criminal proceeding a conviction may result in imprisonment whereas in a civil penalty proceeding the worst that can happen is that the defendant’s career is ruined or his life is wrecked.’
Update, 8 November 2008: When I wrote this post, the Court of Appeal had authoritatively answered another of the questions posed below, about the penalty privileges, but I had not yet read the case, CT v Medical Practitioners Board  VSCA 157. Now I have, and I have posted here about it.
Original post: WPE v Law Institute of Victoria  VCAT 1277 shows that you’ve got to be careful when challenging a decision to cancel or suspend your practising certificate because if the Law Institute wants to sic you, they can seek to establish misconduct against you in the merits review proceedings, and if they get up, VCAT has the same suite of powers as it would following a disciplinary prosecution: s. 2.4.37(3) Legal Profession Act, 2004.
Sometimes, rather than engage in litigation, it is better to play the game, take an early long service leave, help some orphans, have a moment on the road to Damascus, and send in a well thought out application for a new certificate at a well judged time in the future. Saves a lot of costs and maybe a few orphans, lets you have a holiday at the same time, and means there’s never a hearing into the conduct which gave rise to the suspension and/or cancellation. Spend half the money you would have spent on lawyers on a public relations consultant and a lobbyist and you’re doing even better. Other times it’s better to avoid merits review — the obvious remedy specifically provided for in the Legal Profession Act, 2004 — and go for judicial review proper (a course which we now know since Zarah G-W’s cases is kosher; c.f. Perkins v Victorian Bar Inc  VSC 70), especially where the decision making process leading up to the suspension or cancellation is dubious. But sometimes, if a disciplinary charge seems imminent, the question of costs referred to below might recommend getting in early with an application for review of a practising certificate decision which might prevent the laying of disciplinary proceedings proper and lead to adjudication of the issues in a more costs friendly regime. There is much to weigh up in choosing one’s approach when challenging a practising certificate decision.
How these hybrid administrative law and quasi-criminal proceedings are supposed to pan out has been a bit of a mystery to date. They are a new concept. Maybe they are unique — who knows? Anyway, there was certainly no analogue under the Legal Practice Act, 1996. Who bears the burden of proof? Who should go first? Does the privilege against penalties protect the lawyer? Is it an inquisitorial or adversarial proceeding? Should the matters the Law Institute will argue should found disciplinary findings be the subject of properly particularised charges? What about costs? Can the Law Institute apply for disciplinary findings at all, or is it a jurisdiction which must be invoked by VCAT? Judge Ross provided answers to a couple of these questions only in this case. Continue reading “The practising certificate suspension challenge that went wrong”
The nature of a delegation was described in B (A Solicitor) v Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd (2002) 6 VR 642 by counsel and repeated without disapproval by Justices of Appeal Charles and Batt:
‘a delegate acting is not an agent who exercises the [delegator’s] powers but rather, as the new repository of the powers, exercises his own powers as a delegate.’
The same judges explained the purpose of requiring delegations to be in writing:
‘In the circumstances the legislative purpose of permitting a delegation of the functions and powers to be exercised after completion of an investigation, but requiring such a delegation to be in writing, seems to us to be reasonably apparent. We would accept the appellants’ submissions in this regard, that the requirement of a writing protects the interests of all parties concerned.’
Of course that must be so. Those who seek to exercise invasive statutory powers, as trust account inspectors do, should carry around the original instruments of delegation with them in their briefcases. That’s what used to happen in the old days. Continue reading “Some law on the Commissioner’s powers to delegate”
Ms Garde-Wilson’s back in business. In fact she never went out of business, since following the non-renewal of her practising certificate, she held a deemed practising certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, 2004, s. 2.4.5(3) pending her VCAT merits review application. The assertion that she had ceased to be a fit and proper person seems fundamentally to have been about her contempt of the Supreme Court of Victoria in refusing to answer questions on oath, and certain criminal charges which were pending against her. The criminal charges went away, and the Board obviously subsequently formed the view that the unusual circumstances of the contempt conviction were not such as to demonstrate her unfitness to engage in legal practice, and so gave her her practising certificate back. These things are determined at the date of a decision, and so the fact that the Board determined now that Ms Garde-Wilson was a fit and proper person does not necessarily suggest that its decision back then was wrong.
I suspect that Justice Bell commencing his decision in Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board  VSC 225:
‘The plaintiff, a young and intelligent solicitor, was working hard in a firm specialising in criminal law,’
must not have harmed her cause. So too Justice Harper’s reasons for not imposing any sentence on her upon finding her guilty of contempt of court, which began:
‘Zarah Garde-Wilson, you are a solicitor who, on the evidence available to me, is intelligent, hard working and determined to represent your clients to the best of your ability. These are valuable attributes in any legal practitioner. Another such attribute is that combination of learning, technical legal skills and common sense which, appropriately mixed, results in sound judgment. None of us get the combination exactly right all the time.’ (R v Garde-Wilson  VSC 452)
The Age article alerted me to a Zarah decision I had missed, about the detail of which I will fill you in on soon. Here it is: Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board  VSCA 43. The Court of Appeal, led by Justice of Appeal Dodds-Streeton, overturned Justice Bell’s decision mentioned above, which had dismissed Ms Garde-Wilson’s application for judicial review of the Board’s decision to suspend her practising certificate. Justice Bell had said that Ms Garde-Wilson had a perfectly adequate alternative remedy in the merits review option in VCAT, and that is a good reason why judicial review should not be availed of. Not so, said the Court of Appeal.
I only just caught up with the fact that the Court of Appeal has overturned Justice Gillard’s decision in Kabourakis v Medical Board of Victoria  VSC 493, the subject of an earlier post. See  VSC 301.
VCAT’s Vice President Harbison, sitting in the Legal Practice List for the first time I am aware of, has contributed what appears to be a most interesting addition to the authorities about whether solicitors engage in trade and commerce for the purposes of the Fair Trading Act, 1999 (and, by analogy, of the Trade Practices Act, 1974), and whether solicitors may ever be sued under the Fair Trading Act, 1999. As to which, see this earlier post. The decision is Walsh v PJCC&A Pty  VCAT 962 which I will certainly be posting a detailed analysis of.
Then a NSW decision has illustrated again the problem of sloppy regulators failing to consider whether what purports to be a complaint received by them is in fact a complaint as defined by the Act which regulates them (an allegation in both of the cases noted here). This time it was NSW’s Legal Services Commissioner, Steve Mark, getting bashed up by the NSW Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s Legal Services Division in Legal Services Commissioner v SG  NSWADT 48:
’64 As stated, Mr Mark determined that a complaint had been made of deliberate charging of grossly excessive amounts of costs, when no such complaint had been made.
65 Without any further evidence or effort to obtain a valid expert opinion, the LSC instituted the complaint and brought this matter before the Tribunal on the equivocal opinion expressed by Mr McIntyre. Samantha Gulliver investigated the complaint on behalf of Mr Mark, however what, if anything, resulted from such investigation was not placed before the Tribunal. Continue reading “More cases”
Update, 2 September 2010: Just noticed this and thought to store it away here as potentially interesting: http://jade.barnet.com.au/Jade.html#article=229752.
Update, 7 August 2010: The saga continues. See this post.
Update, 17 June 2008: The Age has caught up with this story. It’s a funny old article. Weirdest is this comment ‘A prominent senior counsel said the system was unfair, and any complaint should be forwarded immediately to the subject of the complaint.’ In my experience, the Commissioner does almost invariably send the complaint immediately to the solicitor, and that’s not what the case was about anyway.
Original post: In Byrne v Marles  VSCA 78, the Court of Appeal has thrown a very lean cat amongst some very fat pigeons in a decision which may invalidate all current investigations of the Legal Services Commissioner unless it is overturned on appeal or remedial legislation is passed with retrospective effect (which was the response after the great delegation debacle). The Court found that the Commissioner’s referral to the Law Institute for investigation of what she characterised as a disciplinary complaint was ‘invalid’. In following her absolutely standard practice, the Court said the Commissioner had failed to give natural justice to the solicitor by deciding to characterise the complaint as a disciplinary rather than civil complaint and by deciding not to dismiss it summarily without investigation, without allowing the solicitor to be heard in relation to those preliminary decisions. Anyone — complainant or lawyer — who has a current complaint which is not heading in the desired direction should seek advice from a lawyer with expertise in relation to the professional discipline of lawyers. It is conceivable that the decision may provide options for those against whom professional discipline prosecutions have succeeded under the Legal Profession Act, 2004. Given that the Commissioner never, in my experience, invites discussion about the preliminary questions of whether to dismiss the complaint before commencing an investigation, or on the proper characterisation of the complaint, it seems likely that most of the Commissioner’s decisions to investigate complaints will be ‘invalid’. Continue reading “Court of Appeal wreaks havoc with most current Legal Services Commissioner investigations”
Almost 3 months ago, a 71 year old sole practitioner who has practiced for 28 years was charged with knowingly possessing child pornography and knowingly transmitting an image of a child having sex. He has not admitted the charges which remain to be tried. He is of course presumed innocent. Nevertheless, the Legal Services Board (through its delegate the Law Institute of Victoria) peremptorily suspended his practising certificate without notice. The Board’s reasons do not appear clearly from VCAT’s decision. It would be interesting to know why the fact of a charge sufficed to satisfy the Board that the solicitor’s right to practise law should be terminated immediately and without hearing him on the question. The solicitor applied to VCAT for a de novo review of the decision. Senior Member Howell’s decision is FM v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd  VCAT 692. The solicitor has 30 current files and a quarter of a million dollars in his trust account. He desires to retire on 1 July, and said that if he could have his practising certificate back he would undertake not to take on any new matters, and to wind up his affairs by then. In the face of the Board’s vehement opposition, VCAT said he could have his practising certificate back. Continue reading “Child porn accused gets ticket back on strict conditions”
The latest application for review of a decision of the Legal Services Board decision not to grant a practising certificate was in the matter of DAP v Law Institute of Victoria  VCAT 688. The 57 year old solicitor and former Melbourne Cricket Club Committee member was a property lawyer at one of Melbourne’s megafirms for about 27 years, many of them as a partner. Over the last nine of those years, he committed various acts of professional misconduct associated with the firm’s trust account. Of course the megafirm was not always a megafirm. The solicitor was for most of his career in one of the firms swallowed up into the megafirm. Justice Betty King, in the solicitor’s criminal prosecution said:
‘6. The [offences] are at the lowest end of the scale of offences of this nature. The total involved was just over $9,000 and it was not money that at any stage was ever to be for your own spending. The money was directed into meeting the targets set by your firm for your department. All firms have become hard-headed businesses, with targets and budgets and six minute units which, I add, is, in my view, driving young lawyers out of the profession at a very rapid rate. You, unfortunately, had commenced practice when it was a profession and unlike its current incarnation. It would, of course, have been preferable to have approached your other partners and indicated that it was not possible to meet the budget that had been set for you and suffered the consequences of not meeting that budget. Instead, you chose this course of conduct, the one of stealing money from those accounts. That has resulted in far worse consequences for you, your wife, your children and the community that you had previously served so well. Continue reading “Megafirm partner who stole to make budget gets his ticket back after long holiday”
In JLL v Law Institute of Victoria Limited  VCAT 456, a Box Hill solicitor who had paid only $5,000 of the $55,000 odd he owed under orders of the Legal Profession Tribunal was given a practising certificate by VCAT, overturning a decision of the Law Institute not to give him one on the basis that he was not a fit and proper person. Judge Bowman said the Institute had been wrong to rely on past misconduct which had already been considered by the Legal Profession Tribunal, and in respect of which the solicitor should be deemed to have ‘done his time’, so long as he entered into a repayment plan. Continue reading “Once you’ve done your time, prior misconduct not an indicator of fitness to practise”
Update, 10 June 2008: The Bar’s Ethics Committee dropped the investigation without giving reasons.
Update, 23 November: The press just can’t seem to believe that anyone would be called Issac Brott, inevitably reverting to the more plausible Isaac Brott. And nor do they seem to be reading this blog. Here’s The Australian again claiming the Bar is ‘threatening to end the legal career’ of Peter Faris. I am not aware of any such threat.
Update, 13 November: I suggested below that if there is to be a debate it should be about the merits of the conduct rule they’re wondering if Mr Faris might have broken. It is a close relation of contempt by scandalising the judiciary. Oyiela Litaba’s recent article in the Deakin Law Review may be of interest in that regard: ‘Does the “Offence” of Contempt by Scandalising the Court have a Valid Place in the Law of Modern Day Australia?’  Deakin LRev 6. I should reiterate that I express no opinion on the question, and I am not sure what my opinion would be if I thought about it properly.
Original post: The Ethics Committee of the Victorian Bar has written to fellow Melbourne law blogger Peter Faris QC who has resigned as a consequence and joined the ranks of solicitors. When colourful Melbourne silk Peter Hayes died this year in circumstances said to have been associated with drugs, Mr Faris made comments on his blog about the prevalence of drugs at the Bar, but he did not name any names. That original post, and this one are still up on his blog. I am not sure whether it is the blog post, or other comments Mr Faris made, which got up the nose of the Ethics Committee. The Bar insisted on knowing the names, and when none were forthcoming, it wrote to advise him it was considering writing to the Legal Services Commissioner.
Two things interest me about the whole affair, the substance of which I do not propose to comment on. First, I think the free speech discussion could get a bit more sophisticated. That would involve a focus on the rule which prohibits conduct which would bring the profession into disrepute. Seems to me a debate about whether that is a good rule would be a much more fruitful one than anything presently being tossed around by commentators. Secondly, there is a misunderstanding about what role the Ethics Committee is playing. Being the pedant that I am, I point it out for the benefit of the newspapers. Continue reading “Peter Faris’s comments about drugs and the Bar”
ZG-W v CCW (a firm) (2007) VSC 235 is the latest in the saga of the Legal Practice Board’s practising certificate cancellation of Melbourne’s best known female criminal lawyer. She has succeeded in having the Board’s lawyers enjoined from acting further for the Board on the relatively rare basis that it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if they were permitted to continue to act. They obtained a transcript of an Australian Crime Commission examiner’s interrogation of the solicitor. The solicitor is charged with giving false evidence in that examination which is one of the reasons why the Board refused to renew her practising certificate. Justice Bell said at :
‘The solicitor at the [Office of Public Prosecutions] refused [CCW’s] request because the plaintiff was contesting the allegations and the presumption of innocence applied to her. If I may say so, this is important advice that everybody should keep firmly in mind.’
Because of the invasive powers of compulsion exercised against the solicitor as examinee, the transcript was not permitted to be used otherwise than for the purposes of the examination, though an exception was made for the purposes of the charge of giving false evidence in the examination. The Legal Practice Board, through its lawyers, procured a copy of the transcript for use in the solicitor’s VCAT challenge to the Board’s refusal to renew her practising certificate. The story involves a baptism of fire for a newly admitted solicitor: Continue reading “Supreme Court enjoins Legal Practice Board’s solicitors from continuing to act”
The Ombudsman has been looking into the performance of a regulator, MARA, the Migration Agents Registration Authority. He was critical. His press release is here, the full report here. Reproduced below are the bits about impartiality and the avoidance of conflicts of duties ‘in the case where an industry representative body is also the regulatory body and complaint-handling organisation’. Though the Legal Services Commissioner does not fall into that category, the Uber-regulator’s review of a professional regulator may nevertheless be of interest to those who deal with her. The Ombudsman suggested that oral complaints be taken, reduced to writing by regulator staff, and confirmed by sending out the writing to the complainant. I think that would be an efficient way of dealing with complaints against lawyers by unsophisticated clients. It would be a case of a stitch in time saves nine, and would prevent lawyers from having to respond to allegations which are incomprehensible and legally embarrassing. The Legal Services Commissioner ‘may’ provide assistance to members of the public in making complaints: s. 4.2.12(c) Legal Profession Act, 2004. Under s. 123(5) of the Legal Practice Act, 1996, the Law Institute’s Professional Standards were obliged to assist if asked, but to my knowledge they rarely did so, and I am aware of instances where assistance was formally sought but refused. Now, that extract from the report I mentioned: Continue reading “The regulator’s regulator, the Ombudsman, criticises Migration Agents’ bureau de spank”
VCAT’s Acting President Judge Bowman today handed down a long and important decision in relation to the relationship between alleged failures to follow the procedures for investigating complaints against professionals laid down by legislation and the jurisdiction of the disciplinary tribunal to hear charges laid as a result of such investigations. After eight months’ thought, his Honour decided that VCAT did have jurisdiction in the matter of Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v IAB  VCAT 808, and that anything which could have been done better by the Law Institute were not productive of such unfairness as to invalidate the charge laid in the tribunal. In the course of doing so, he provided this summary of the leading case on point, Murray v Legal Services Commissioner (1999) 46 NSWR 224:
An elder statesman of Victoria’s professional discipline community quietly observed to me the other day that Victoria’s Legal Services Commissioner, Victoria Marles, is yet to lay a disciplinary charge before VCAT. That’s an average of none per month over the 16 months her office has existed. In view of the fact that she is required by s. 4.4.13(2) to prosecute every case of intentional or reckless breach of the Legal Profession Act, 2004 or of the solicitors’ or barristers’ conduct rules, this state of affairs, if accurate, suggests that Victoria’s barristers and solicitors are behaving as never before, all of a sudden. The Register of Disciplinary Action certainly does not suggest a high level of activity. Monday’s Law List for VCAT shows Senior Member Howell, formerly the Legal Profession Tribunal’s Registrar, occupied with a Legal Practice List matter, but Member Butcher, formerly that Tribunal’s Deputy Registrar, sitting in other lists, as seems to be a common occurrence.
Interestingly, the redoubtable Daming He is back on Monday in VCAT-pretending-to-be-the-Full-Legal-Profession- Tribunal, presided over by Vice President Bowman. Bowman VP’s new co-Vice President is Marilyn Harbison. Many practitioners know her Honour from when she presided for many years over County Court civil directions days. Vice President Harbison was appointed by the Kennet Government to the County Court in January 1996 after 18 years’ full time legal practice. Her areas of expertise in practice were building and allied disciplines and insolvency, however she has been both a member of a lawyers’ disciplinary tribunal, and a conciliator of solicitor-client disputes under the Legal Profession Practice Act. At the time of her appointment, she was the President of Victoria’s Public Interest Law Clearing House. Now she heads up one of VCAT’s three divisions, the Human Rights Division. Her Honour has already decided a salacious professional discipline case, described in the next post, along with a number of discrimination cases and Working With Children Act cases.
And of course the other news is that Justice Morris has resigned as VCAT’s President, four years into his 5 year term, and has resigned his lifetime appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria in favour of practising at the Bar, though he will not be appearing before the Supreme Court or VCAT for 4 years because of the conduct rules governing barristers. He joins a growing list of retirements from senior judicial office in Victoria after only short stints in favour of a return to the Bar which now includes Justice Tony Pagone of the Supreme Court and Justices Neil Young and Ron Merkel of the Federal Court. More to come, too, I hear.
The unsuccessful complaint to the Legal Ombudsman, referred by her to the Victorian Bar, took more than 5 months to complete. Then the Law Institute complaint went on for about 2 months. The Legal Profession Tribunal made a decision 10 months later, the Full Legal Profession Tribunal 3 months later again. The Court of Appeal process took two and a quarter years. Continue reading “Daming He’s experience of the legal regulators”
Update: 17 January 2008 VCAT has re-heard this case, and has made different findings of fact from some of those recounted below. See He v A & Co Pty Ltd  VCAT 3.
(This is part 2 of the post about He v A & Co Pty Ltd  VSCA 150;  VSCA 235. Part 1 is here.)
Mr He had a dispute with the insurer of the negligent driver who caused the collision which damaged his car. The insurer accepted its driver was at fault. The dispute was only about how much compensation Mr He was legally entitled to. Whatever a court would order the negligent driver to pay, the insurer would pay Mr He, at least in theory. Most “crash and bash cases”, as lawyers call them never get to court. His did. The insurer said his car was only worth $800 at the time of the accident, and since repairs would cost $4,000, they would take his car and sell it for scrap, and pay him its value. They said it was an economic write off. Continue reading “The subject matter of Daming He’s complaint”
B (A Solicitor) v Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd (2002) 6 VR 642 (Ormiston, Charles and Batt JJA)
The Law Institute corresponded with the solicitors in this matter between 1998 and October 2000. The CEO Ian Dunn, wrote what is known in the game as “a Murray letter” on 16 October 2000. That is a letter summarising the tentative conclusions of an investigation giving a practitioner a final opportunity to comment before a final decision to lay a charge. The two solicitors in this case were given 7 days in which to respond. One of them replied at length and indicated he did not desire an extension of time, the other did not request an extension. Later, their lawyers took the point that the charge was invalid and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction not properly invoked. The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in relation to this aspect of the Tribunal’s decision because, it found, the finding that sufficient time had been afforded was a question of fact, and it had jurisdiction only to hear appeals on a question of law. Nevertheless, the majority ventured some dicta. Continue reading “Procedural fairness: “Murray letters” considered by Victorian Court of Appeal”
B (A Solicitor) v Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd (2002) 6 VR 642 (Ormiston, Charles and Batt JJA)
The Law Institute of Victoria Limited used to be named Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd. It, and the Victorian Bar, were the only two RPAs (Recognised Professional Associations) set up under the Legal Practice Act, 1996, which allowed for an unlimited number of RPAs. Under s. 313 of that Act, it was entitled to delegate in writing powers and functions to employees. If it did not do so, its board (styled “the Council”) would have had to make every decision.
The Law Institute charged two solicitors with misconduct. Six months later, it sought leave to withdrew the charges, on the basis that its “failure to follow strict process” had resulted in the charge laid being a nullity. The Tribunal allowed the Law Institute to do so, refused to dismiss the charges, and refused to order costs.
The Law Institute’s Council minuted a recommendation that its powers under s. 151, the provision requiring the RPA to take certain courses at the end of a disciplinary investigation, and giving it certain discretions, be delegated to its CEO, Ian Dunn. At the end of the minutes, the word “confirmed” was typed, and they were signed by the Chair.
Pursuant to s. 151, Dunn signed new charges against the same solicitors, purportedly as delegate of the Law Institute. The Court of Appeal found that the Legal Profession Tribunal had erred in finding it had jurisdiction. It found that a written minute of an oral recommendation to delegate a power was not a written instrument of delegation. Because the person who signed the charge had no authority to do so, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was not properly invoked, and it had no jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal ordered the charges dismissed.
For the peak lawyers’ body in the State practising under the business name “Professional Standards” it was an embarrassing lapse which threw the world of professional discipline into chaos for months (Ormiston JA observed at  that he found it “surprising that a body made up of qualified and experienced lawyers should take a course as was here adopted without there having been some explicit authority which would justify their actions”.) Because the procedural defect did not apply only to the particular delegation in question, huge numbers of decisions stood amenable of being set aside, or ignored (since an order made by a statutory Tribunal without jurisdiction need not be obeyed). Urgent retrospective legislation had to be rushed through parliament.
The architects of this most exquisitely technical of victories were Terry O’Conner and barristers he retained, Rod Garrett QC and Bob Miller.
Continue reading “The great delegation debacle: B (A solicitor) v Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd”