Breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship: ‘good cause’ for sacking the client?

Update, 14 February 2009: A judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia said this in Everingham v Mullins [2000] SASC 448:

’12 The appellants maintain that Stanleys undertook an entire job and were not entitled to be paid when they were reluctant to continue the third set of proceedings. The Magistrate found: (par 28)

“There had been a complete breakdown in the solicitor/client relationship. Mr Bourne said that he could not get a simple task done by a junior solicitor without criticism from the Everinghams, and by then he felt that he was in a conflict situation because he had no enthusiasm to act in the third judicial review and therefore he was not any longer prepared to act. By offering the Everinghams the option of going to another solicitor he felt that the conflict would resolve. I should point out that the third judicial review was in turn discontinued, apparently on the advice of Caldicott and Co.”

13 The instructions came to an end by mutual consent. Mrs Everingham refused even to speak to a junior solicitor who was sent to a routine listing conference by Stanleys. In my opinion, the Everinghams were not entitled to avoid paying their solicitors by reason of the circumstances in which the relationship came to an end.’

Update, 13 July 2008: A commenter, ‘purplehazel’, has provided such a learned response that I repeat it below.  Let’s keep working on this problem people, and see what the readers of this blog can come up with:

I think asking for “authority for the proposition that a solicitor may terminate a client retainer where the relationship of solicitor and client has irretrievably broken down?” is too broad a question. You have to consider the reasons for the breakdown.

The solicitor can’t get rid of the client on a whim, but case law and practice rules would support it the following contexts; refusal to comply with discovery, committing or telling the solicitor of plans to commit perjury, potential ‘abuse of process’ scenarios that you can’t talk the client out of and situations where the client wants you to break the law.

As for case law that simply refers to the ‘breakdown of the relationship’ all I’ve been able to come across so far is this:

Para [105] of Ahmed v Russell Kennedy (a firm) [2000] VSC 41 (23 February 2000)

“[105] I do not see why the learned magistrate should not have concluded that each of the appellant’s refusal (or failure, in the circumstances) to pay any outstanding disbursements, and the breakdown in the solicitor/client relationship – in the context of what his Worship might have concluded was the appellant’s knowing misstatement of the terms of the retainer – gave good cause for the solicitors to terminate the retainer.”

But…reference to the ‘breakdown in the solicitor/client relationship’ does seem to be a consequence of the fee dispute and not a separate ground. It did however cause me to have a closer look at Underwood Son & Piper v Lewis [1894] 2 QB 306 [a decision of the English CoA] which Halsbury’s laws of Australia has as the leading case.

Underwood is authority for the idea that the retainer is an entire contract and can only be terminated by the solicitor on “good cause and reasonable notice”. It includes analogies about cigars and shoes from Re Hall & Barker ((1878) 9 Ch D 538 at 545):

‘If a man engages to carry a box of cigars from London to Birmingham, it is an entire contract, and he cannot throw the cigars out of the carriage half-way there, and ask for half the money; or if a shoemaker agrees to make a pair of shoes, he cannot offer you one shoe and ask you to pay one half the price.’

However, Underwood doesn’t just refer to a client’s failure to put the solicitor in funds to meet disbursements; to insistence by the client that the solicitor take some dishonourable step; and to circumstances where the client hinders /prevents the solicitor’s actions [the 3 instances related in Halsbury’s laws of Australia at [250-465] footnote 9] it also includes this obiter comment from AL Smith LJ:

“and many cases situations may be supposed in which the solicitor may be entitled to refuse to act for the client any further.”

Interesting that the cases citing Underwood seem less about what the solicitor may or may not do, and more about whether they can’t stop acting and still expect to be paid for what they’ve done so far (or to keep payments already received).

Relevant questions on the facts – is there one contract with the client or a series of separate ones? to what extent can a written costs agreement or other agreement that sets up the retainer simply take the relationship between the parties out of the realm of the ‘entire contract’ altogether?

There’s another passing reference (which doesn’t really help much) in R v Promizio [2004] NSWCCA 75 (31 March 2004) at [33].

Conflicts between self interest [the risk of disciplinary or other sanctions] and the duty to the client would arise in the examples I suggest in the second paragraph of this comment – but they are probably best seen as part of the duty to uphold the law/duty to the court.’

Original post: One of the solicitors I have done some work for has several times told me that she ‘sacked the client’. Though clients can terminate the solicitor-client relationship without notice and for whatever reason they like, there are limits on solicitors’ entitlement to do so; even non-payment of fees only entitles you to cease acting pending payment, at least until the situation becomes chronic. I am going through a phase of looking unsuccessfully for authority for propositions I thought I know to be correct, and not finding them. Hence this call to readers: can you point me to authority for the proposition that a solicitor may terminate a client retainer where the relationship of solicitor and client has irretrievably broken down? Or authority for the proposition that in that situation, a solicitor ought not to continue acting because to do so would involve a conflict between self-interest and duty to the client? Here’s a recent case from the Utah Supreme Court which discusses the US authorities on this issue, where breakdown of the relationship is obviously good cause for a solicitor terminating a retainer. What about in Anglo-Australian law? Anybody?

Law Institute seeks 50 year ban for 62 year old solicitor

In Law Institute of Victoria v DSS [2008] VCAT 1179, the Institute sought in a misconduct prosecution an order that the solicitor not be allowed to handle trust monies for 50 years. Vice President Judge Ross described the submission as ‘somewhat excessive’.

The solicitor had stolen $75,000 from his clients and out of his trust account, lied to a trust account inspector, removed evidence so as to hinder his investigation, and involved a client in misleading the inspector by dictating a letter full of lies and having her sign it and send it to the inspector with a view to perverting the course of justice. These were ‘manifestly serious’ instances of misconduct. In a criminal prosecution, Justice Lasry had sentenced the solicitor to 18 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended. The solicitor was suffering from a mental illness at the time when he committed the offences. A family law client had been murdered by her husband at the County Court more or less in the solicitor’s presence and he had not coped well. There was a psychiatrist’s report. The solicitor was remorseful and his remediation was well advanced. He had paid back all the stolen monies. He was working in a business which provided services to body corporates, and his employer was supportive. On his return to practice, he intended to confine himself to body corporate law.

In these circumstances, the Institute contended that an appropriate disposition for the disciplinary charges arising out of the same facts as the criminal charges was: Continue reading “Law Institute seeks 50 year ban for 62 year old solicitor”

Kylie’s one-time lawyer before VCAT’s Legal Practice List

Update, 18 July 2008: Make that a $200,000, not $20,000, loan from rock impressario Michael Gudinski. I like the way he gave evidence to VCAT’s Legal Practice List by mobile phone from a US Billy Joel concert. Leonie Wood’s report for The Age is here.

Update, 15 July 2008: Apparently the Law Institute’s trust account inspector Ron Hall thumped the table while under cross-examination by the lawyer’s counsel. What drama! The Age‘s report is here. Mr Hall’s evidence provides a fascinating insight into the way trust account inspectors employed by the Law Institute think. Mr Hall said at one stage, he thought ‘right, I have enough here to put a practitioner up for alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct’. Inspectors hold statutory office as individuals, and their job is to investigate compliance with the trust account regime, and to report their results to the Legal Services Board. The Legal Services Commissioner is charged with bringing prosecutions for misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct. Many trust account inspectors are employees of the Law Institute, and the Board delegates its functions in relation to trust accounts to the Institute. The Commissioner outsources the investigation of allegations of unsatisfactory conduct and misconduct to the Institute too. This is under the new simpler, more transparent, new and improved no-self-regulation-here! regime set up at such expense of paper and ink by the Legal Profession Act, 2004. According to The Age:

‘Mr Hall was asked if, during his investigation, he acted “at the express behest of the Australian Crime Commission”. He first said “yes”, adding he had been subpoenaed by the ACC. Asked again by VCAT deputy president Mark Dwyer, Mr Hall said the LIV investigation was his own work. But then he revealed that ACC officers gave him one of their documents.’

Update, 12 July 2008: The lawyer failed in his bid to have the Supreme Court prevent the Legal Profession Tribunal continuing to hear the disciplinary charges against him. And The Age reports on one of the transactions under scrutiny, a loan by Michael Gudinski to his then lawyer, of $20,000, said by the Legal Services Commissioner to be inadequately documented, and a breach of professional standards.Original post: The lawyer towards the centre of the regulators’ tax probe Project Wickenby, once Kylie Minogue’s and other celebrities’ lawyer, is again in the news as his VCAT Legal Practice List prosecution continues in his absence overseas. He has appealed Deputy President Dwyer’s refusal to adjourn the disciplinary hearing on the basis it would prejudice the hearing of what the solicitor claims are imminent criminal charges and the appeal will be heard in the Supreme Court on Friday morning. His barrister says he has no instructions in relation to the disciplinary matters. The Commissioner alleges the solicitor provided no cooperation with the investigation. I am not aware of Deputy President Dwyer sitting in the Legal Practice List before. He was the head of Freehills’s Environment and Planning Group and was appointed DP on 1 April 2007.

As far as I can see from Austlii, all of his decisions written reasons for which have been published on Austlii have involved local councils and I infer that they have all been planning matters. There is one exception: a real property list matter. A web profile of Mr Dwyer before his appointment says: Continue reading “Kylie’s one-time lawyer before VCAT’s Legal Practice List”

Robyn Tampoe, Schapelle Corby’s solicitor

Update, 10 June 2009: Mr Tampoe has been struck off the roll of solicitors.

Update, 7 July 2008: Watch the video of Tampoe slagging off his client here.

Original post: Lawyers and their regulators should care about the Corby case, because at the relevant time, a lot of people loved Schapelle and Schapelle does not now much like her lawyers. One of them has hit back, calling the Corbys “the biggest pile of trash I have ever come across in my life”. People will think this is normal, or at least the tip of the iceberg. And much confusion seems to be going around about Mr Tampoe’s fabrication of a defence for Corby. For giving this interview, and saying this, I condemn Mr Tampoe, who is no longer a solicitor, with all my fibre. What I question below is whether the media have got their reportage of his claim to have completely fabricated the defence right — if he means what I imagine he means, I say — so what? Whether or not the media have got it right, I reckon his comments might well harm his former client. They could have been personally deeply hurtful, they could affect her treatment in jail, they could affect any claim for clemency she might in the future make, and they could affect the result of the prisoner exchange treaty negotiations underway between the Australian and Indonesian governments, or the speed with which they progress. Continue reading “Robyn Tampoe, Schapelle Corby’s solicitor”

From the newspapers

Friday is definitely law news day. The Australian and the Australian Financial Review both have several pages of law news of a Friday. I might try to bring to the attention of you readers articles of interest from both on a relatively regular basis.

First though, some things from not-Friday. ABC Radio National’s The Law Report has the founder of Crimassist (which I mentioned here) tête-à-tête with the CEO of the Law Institute of Victoria. And The Age reported this week on a VCAT Legal Practice List case where a legal regulator is again alleged to have put illegally obtained evidence to use against a lawyer, this time the lawyer towards the centre of the tax fraud investigation, Project Wickenby. His bid to stay his disciplinary hearing pending what he said were imminent criminal charges failed, and the disciplinary hearing will proceed on Tuesday.

The Times has an article on a House of Lords decision which has put an end to what sounds like a relatively undesirable system in Old Blighty of allowing prosecutors to apply ex parte for orders anonymising witnesses in fear of their life if they testify. Better to preserve the common law rule that a defendant is entitled to confront his accusers than to risk some guilty folk walking free for want of evidence against them.  And the English are reviewing their system of no-win no-pay retainers. But unlike in Victoria, where the maximum success fee is 25% of the ‘normal’ fee (whatever that is), in England, a solicitor whose client succeeds can double their ‘normal fee’.

Le Oz has an article on a 34 year old Perth lawyer convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice by convincing a witness not to give evidence against her de facto, who stood charged with conspiracy to commit a violent crime. The Western Australian Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee was meeting yesterday to consider her future as a lawyer. The comparison with that other case involving a 30 something female criminal lawyer and her late gangster de facto may be interesting. It also reports that the inter-state argy-bargy on a uniform national electronic conveyancing system in which Victoria has featured prominently has been resolved. A good thing too: this boring subject was clogging the Legal Affairs pages for too long. Meanwhile, the Conveyancers Act, 2006 (Vic.) came into operation on 1 July 2008. It repeals the bit in the Legal Profession Act, 2004 about conveyancers.

Amazingly, The Fin has a man with a barrister’s wig on its front page with the caption ‘Many barristers have grown frustrated with outdated practices’ as a hook to an article about the not especially newsworthy opening up of a new 18 room barristers chambers. It’s privately run you see, unlike the chambers owned by the Victorian Bar where 63 per cent of Victoria’s barristers are accommodated. I went and checked out Dawson Chambers today. They’re pretty flash, and house several of my mates, but sport views of the next door building. They’re set up by Stephen O’Bryan SC and David Klempfner. Stephen’s brother Norman O’Bryan SC is my landlord at Melbourne Chambers.

The Fin also reports on a NSW law which will make it a criminal offence for causing ‘annoyance or inconvenience’ to participants in World Youth Day. I wonder whether there is a Papal immunity which will immunise his Holiness from prosecution for the inconvenience of the sinfulness of contraception.

Court’s discretion in relation to costs not abrogated by contractual promise to pay indemnity costs

Update, 23 January 2009: See also Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Burstone Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] VSC 137, Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Whitehorse Property Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 309Irani v St. George Bank Limited [2005] VSC 456; Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45.

Original post: National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway [2008] NSWSC 485 reiterates and approves the following propositions to be found in Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1999] SASC 533 per Olsson, Debelle and Wicks JJ (at [32]):

‘The general rule is that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a mortgagee is entitled to costs on a party and party basis: The Kestrel (1866) LR1A&E 78; In re Queen’s Hotel (Cardiff) Ltd; In re, Veronon Tin Plate Company Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 792; Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd District Bank Ltd v Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 955; Re Shanahan; Re A Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132; Jamieson v Gosigil Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 117; AGC (Advances) Ltd v West; AGC (Advances) Ltd v Cranston (1984) 5 NSWLR 301; Katsaounis v Belehris (1994) 179 LSJS 143 at 155 – 156. The expression of a contrary intention must be “plainly and unambiguously expressed” to use the words of Vaisey J in Re Adelphi Hotel Co Ltd (above) at 961. Generally speaking, a contractual obligation to pay all costs is not construed to require payment of costs improperly or unreasonably incurred, such an obligation being open to objection on public policy grounds: Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 at 187 – 188. That difficulty does not exist in this case since the obligation to pay solicitor and own client costs is subject to conditions as to reasonableness: Citibank Savings Ltd v Pirrotta [1998] ANZ ConvR 442; Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Eagle Star Nominees Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9205. To make good any objection upon taxation, the mortgagors should be required to satisfy the taxing officer of the unreasonableness of the item, doubts being resolved in favour of the mortgagee: Katsaounis v Belehris (above) at 157 approved in Citibank Savings Ltd v Pirrotta.’

But it also says:

The court will usually give effect to an express contractual obligation but, nevertheless, retains a discretion to award costs on some other basis: ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd v Gibson [1981] 2 NZLR 513 at 524 – 525.’

Onus of proof in costs disputes between lawyers and clients

In Nicholson v B&S [2000] VLPT 28, the Legal Profession Tribunal’s Registrar Howell, considered three questions about the burden of proof:

  1. Where there is a dispute about the amount of legal costs, must the client prove that the costs were too great, or must the lawyer prove that the costs were just right?
  2. Where there is an application to set aside a costs agreement, must the client prove that there was a costs agreement as a starting point in the case, or must the lawyer?
  3. If a client alleges, as a reason why a costs agreement should be set aside pursuant to s. 103 of the Legal Practice Act, 1996, that the lawyer engaged in misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct, does she have to prove the allegation according to the Briginshaw standard of proof or is it sufficient to prove it on the balance of probabilites as more ordinarily understood?

The second one is obvious, an issue thrown up only by an out of left field submission by an unrepresented litigant. The answer is that the client must prove the existence of a costs agreement before an order may be made at her application for it to be set aside. The answer to the third is simple: the Briginshaw standard described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 @ 362, which says, in its application to disciplinary proceedings —

The civil burden of proof — on the balance of probabilities — means different things in different cases. If you want to make out a case of serious wrongdoing, like misconduct, you’d better do a good job of convincing the Court.

The first is a little less obvious. Here is Registrar Howell’s take on the issue: Continue reading “Onus of proof in costs disputes between lawyers and clients”

Online archive of classic cases as reported in The Times

The Times has put online facsimiles of the original newspaper law reports of 200 classic cases which have been influential in moulding British law.  The Times Law Reports are actually to be found daily in The Times.  I met an urbane thong vendor in a small seaside village near Columbo once who read them religiously, pointing out that as a businessman, it was important for him to keep up with law.  It was a beautiful moment.  They are summaries, written by barristers, unlike most of the modern Australian reports which contain the full text of a judgment, only rarely edited, accompanied by a headnote.  Here, for example, is Donaghue v Stephenson. David Pannick QC’s paean to the law reporters of The Times may be found here. The article points out that not all law reporters have been so well received:

‘Isaac Espinasse was a law reporter working at the end of the 18th century. In a 1953 case in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Denning commented on the inadequacy of his work, noting: “It is said that he only heard half of what went on and reported the other half.”’

Two costs disclosure default cases in VCAT

In retainers governed by the Legal Profession Act, 2004, failures to disclose matters which the Act requires to be disclosed about future legal costs can have the result that the solicitors may not recover their fees whether by proceedings or otherwise until they have been the subject of a solicitor-client taxation in the Supreme Court, generally at the solicitors’ expense regardless of who ‘wins’ the taxation (i.e. regardless of whether the Supreme Court affirms the solicitors’ bill or substantially discounts it). The draconian provision which says so, s. 3.4.17, and the provision which says one of the things non-disclosure of will trigger s. 3.4.17 is a change to the original estimate (s. 3.4.16) are set out at the end of this post.

In the first case, a file handler changed firms. The new firm did not reiterate the old firm’s estimate of fees and they were told to go off and have a Supreme Court taxation over a bill for $2,500 before coming back and continuing their proceeding. Unless the solicitor is found not to be entitled to any fees, a Supreme Court taxation ends with a Supreme Court order to the client to pay the amount found to be appropriate. The solicitor would presumably go back to the Tribunal only if there were defences which the Taxing Master did not have power to deal with and which VCAT’s Legal Practice List would.

In the second, the failure of a solicitor to update his fee estimate for the first 10 days of a retainer in which the original estimate blew out by over 50%, was found not to have breached s. 3.4.16 because in the context of the retainer over 10 days, it was not reasonably practicable to give the update. The decision must mean that there is no absolute duty on a solicitor to keep track of costs as they are accruing and to advise the client when the original estimate is exceeded. Continue reading “Two costs disclosure default cases in VCAT”

Solicitor reprimanded for letting conveyancer steal monies from his office account

Legal Services Commissioner v WP [2008] VCAT 983 was a guilty plea. A sole practitioner and ex-cop shared offices with a Turkish conveyancer named Dervish. The solicitor practised as a sole practitioner under the name “Thomasz and Dervish”, even though Mr Dervish’s only connection with the legal practice was that he shared premises with it. The solicitor allowed the conveyancer to become a signatory to his office account (i.e. not his trust account), he said, because utilities bills were made out to both of them. Over a period of one and a half years, Dervish put more than $750,000 of the conveyancing business’s clients’ funds through the solicitor’s office account. Dervish misappropriated about $180,000. The solicitor said though he was aware that the solicitor from whom he had bought the practice, who had also shared premises with Dervish, had had an issue with Dervish in which a substantial sum of money went missing, he never noticed these transactions. He pleaded guilty to misconduct under the Legal Practice Act, 1996 constituted by a reckless failure to comply with this practice rule:

“A practitioner must ensure that each part of the practitioner’s legal practice is, at all times, carried on or effectively supervised by a legal practitioner.”

Vice-President Ross adopted the solicitor’s suggestion as to an appropriate disposition, making the following orders:

Continue reading “Solicitor reprimanded for letting conveyancer steal monies from his office account”

Lawyers’ fees are hot news all of a sudden

Update, 26 June 2008: The managing partner of the controversial NSW personal injury practice referred to below was fined $10,000 by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal’s Legal Services List for advertising in contravention of conduct rules despite a prior warning from the Legal Services Commissioner.  One wonders whether any enquiry was entered into about how much business was generated by the advertising.  If not, the fine of $10,000 may in fact attract further breaches of the law as a cost effective means  of buying your way out of the prohibition on advertising.

The Australian reports that there are calls for national unification of the over-complicated and increasingly divergent costs disclosure regimes around the country.

Original article: Front page article in The Melbourne Times: ‘Case for Change: Putting the Cost of Justice on Trial’. It’s all about a pack of convicted crims who have set up an electronic vehicle for the dissemination of jailhouse savvy, the wonderfully named ‘Crimassist‘. They tend towards the view that legal fees are a bit on the high side. You can bet your bottom dollar that the unqualified practice boffin at the Law Institute is watching keenly despite the anonymous website proprietors’ brilliant anti-conviction technique of plastering the site with explanations that none of it is legal advice. Then there’s a long Sydney Morning Herald article about a prominent Sydney personal injuries practice which is either so seriously on the nose that it’s surprising that their practising certificates haven’t been suspended, or, as they say, victims of a terrible vendetta by embittered former employees who are controlling and manipulating their former clients. If nothing else, it must be said that the firm is very generous: when one of its clients complained of overcharging, it flicked him $100,000 and later said it was just a commercial goodwill gesture, and no admission at all of overcharging. Then Victoria’s Attorney-General has lashed out at barristers’ fees out of the blue, prompting a fairly strong response from the likes of Richter and Burnside QCs. Continue reading “Lawyers’ fees are hot news all of a sudden”

Lawyer to gangland figures not guilty of alleged crimes

The Crown entered a nolle prosequi on Tuesday on the charges of giving false evidence against Melbourne’s best known female criminal lawyer, Z G-W. In other words, they dropped the charges before trial for want of a reasonable prospect of conviction. The key witness was unable to remember crucial evidence which the Crown obviously figured he would remember. The most interesting fact to emerge from this latest development in the saga is that one of the bits of allegedly false evidence was that spirits had told the solicitor the details of Lewis Caine’s murder. She said that spirits were talking to her. It will be interesting to see what the Legal Practice Board and VCAT make of all this. The solicitor’s VCAT proceeding is a merits review under the VCAT Act, 1998 of the Board’s decision not to renew the solicitor’s practising certificate. Parties to such proceedings may not refuse to answer questions on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination: ss. 80(3), 105 of the VCAT Act, 1998 which are reproduced below.

I wonder whether anything would stop the Board from calling the solicitor as its own witness and just asking her whether she lied on oath, or, if she were to give evidence, cross-examining her about this. If she did, she would presumably be obliged to say so honestly, though her answers could not be used to prosecute her again, only to inform VCAT in its decision about whether she is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certifiate. In ascertaining whether a person is of good fame and character, or otherwise a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, the stipes are entitled to take into account not only criminal convictions but criminal charges, even where the charge resulted in an acquittal: Frugtniet v Board of Examiners [2002] VSC 140, a decision of Justice Pagone. Continue reading “Lawyer to gangland figures not guilty of alleged crimes”

Pastor-solicitor-property developer profiled in the Sunday Age

The latest lawyer profile in a weekend zine is the Sunday Age‘s portrait of a fundamentalist preacher cum solicitor cum property developer’s stoush with some parishoners who say he allowed them to have a part of a property investment which would yield profits over the one year of the investment of 25% to 45%, only for it to go bad in ways they’re not entirely sanguine about. He used to be a Melbourne solicitor, and is a graduate of the school of Henry Kaye. Notwithstanding his status as a man of the cloth, the portrait is not quite as hagiographical as some of the other portraits mentioned in this earlier post identifying the mainstream media lawyer profile phenomenon, and therefore makes it all the more worth the read. For example, I like the way the pastor-solicitor-property developer’s wife Lorilea is said by the Sunday Age to have suggested the parishoner-investor rid himself of his undue focus on things material and stop fighting ‘tooth and nail for those things that rust and moth doth corrupt.’ I just love that use of ‘moth’ with ‘doth’, though credit must go to Matthew at chapter 6 verse 20.

Negligent misstatement limitation period lecture

Update, 20 November 2008: The latest decision is Pegasus Management Holdings S.C.A. v Ernst & Young (a firm) [2008] EWHC 2720 (Ch).  A CMS Cameron McKenna Law Now note may be read here.

Original post: The Law Institute is putting on a lecture at lunchtime on 24 June 2008 by an ex-megafirms lawyer who has gone boutique, Margot Clarkson. It will be about the very specific topic of limitation periods for negligent misstatement cases (though somewhat oddly, the case featured in the flyer, Wardley v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 is a pure misleading and deceptive conduct case).  I treated that topic at some length in an article imaginatively titled ‘Legal Professional Liability Part II’ at (2001) 9 Torts Law Journal 1 (I have reproduced the relevant bit below), and have blogged about it from time to time since (see these posts).  It’s a difficult topic, and such a seminar is welcome. It costs $80 for LIV members and $160 for non-members.

This is what I said in the article: Continue reading “Negligent misstatement limitation period lecture”

Substantial personal costs order application against solicitor fails

The latest application for an order that a party’s solicitor pay the costs of proceedings personally is Whyked Pty Ltd v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 477. In dismissing the application, Justice McDougall commented:

‘[185] In theory, the courts are open to all. In practice, access to the courts is often dictated by the availability of financial resources. That is an unfortunate fact of life. It does not mean that those without resources should be barred from the courts, particularly where legal practitioners are prepared to accept instructions on a contingency basis.

[186] The policy underlying the power of the courts to order for security costs is based on different considerations. Undoubtedly, the exercise of that power has the effect from time to time of preventing arguable cases from being run. Where that happens, it should be pursuant to an order of a court on an application for security for costs, after balancing all relevant considerations. It should not be pursuant to a decision of a legal practitioner who is afraid to accept instructions from an impecunious client because the defendant, if successful, may obtain an order for costs against the legal practitioner personally.’

His Honour stated the law as follows: Continue reading “Substantial personal costs order application against solicitor fails”

Misfeasance in public office claim against solicitor survives immunity strike out application

The latest advocates’ immunity case is Noori v Leerdam [2008] NSWSC 515. The defendant solicitor was said to have been guilty of misfeasance in public office constituted by work he did for Phillip Ruddock as Immigration Minister in relation to merits review litigation about the plaintiff, an Afghan refugee applicant who rotted in an immigration jail for 6 years despite having committed no crime in Australia. The solicitor sought summary judgment on the basis of advocates’ immunity. The Court declined to give it to him, saying the question of whether immunity could be claimed against allegations of misfeasance in public office or collateral abuse of process was insufficiently obvious to found a summary judgment, and would have to be fully argued at trial.  The relevant part of the judgment says: Continue reading “Misfeasance in public office claim against solicitor survives immunity strike out application”

Barristers never used to need practising certificates

Justice Fullagar narrated the history of practising certificates and barristers in Victorian Lawyers RPA Limited v Henderson [1999] VLPT 13:

‘For brevity we shall refer collectively to the succession of statutes governing legal practice in Victoria from the time of the Royal Assent to the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 until the present day as the legal practice acts. Until 1989 the legal practice acts did not require a legal practitioner to have a practising certificate if he or she was engaged in practice exclusively as a barrister. In 1989 the legal practice acts were amended, and what might be called the certificate-free area was restricted to those legal practitioners whose names were on the Bar Roll kept by the Victorian Bar Council. Finally the Legal Practice Act of 1996 provided and still provides that so far as Victorian practitioners are concerned no person whatever shall engage in legal practice unless the person holds a practising certificate. See section 314. The contents of sub-sections (5) and (6), and the penalty of two years imprisonment for engaging in practice without a certificate, demonstrate the importance of these fundamental provisions in the eye of the legislature.

Clause 10 sub-clause 3 of Schedule 2 of the Act of 1996 provided that those practitioners who were on the bar roll need not have a practising certificate until April 1997.’

What happens when complainant lodges complaint with wrong regulator and it gets transferred

In Byrne v Marles [2008] VSCA 78, the subject of this earlier post, another issue arose. Justice Nettle confirmed that a complaint made to anyone other than the Commissioner is invalid as a trigger for the operation of the Legal Profession Act, 2004, but that if it finds its way to the Commissioner otherwise than by the complainant re-lodging it with her, and the complainant says he’s happy for the complaint to continue as a complaint to the Commissioner, then that counts as a deemed lodging by the complainant of a complaint with the correct regulator. Continue reading “What happens when complainant lodges complaint with wrong regulator and it gets transferred”